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Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this study was to investigate
failed interpersonal affect regulation through the lens of
humor. We investigated individual differences that influ-
enced people’s affective and cognitive responses to failed
humor and their willingness to persist in the interpersonal
regulation of positive affect after a failed attempt.
Design/Methodology/Approach Using well-established
autobiographical narrative methods and surveys, we col-
lected data at two time points. All participants (n = 127)
received identical surveys at time 1. At time 2, they were
randomly assigned to complete a narrative about either
successful or failed humor as well as a second survey.
Findings Using moderated regression analyses and SEM,
we found significant differences between our failed and
successful humor conditions. Specifically, individual dif-
ferences, including gender, affective perspective taking,
and humor self-efficacy, were associated with negative
reactions to failed humor and the willingness of individuals
to persist in the interpersonal regulation of positive affect.
Moreover, affective perspective taking moderated the
effect of gender in both the failed and successful humor
conditions.
Implications Our results suggest that failed humor is no
laughing matter. Understanding individuals’ willingness to
continue in attempts to regulate the affect of others con-
tributes to the comprehension of an understudied
phenomenon that has implications for interpersonal
behavior in organizations such as helping, group decision
making, and intragroup conflict.
Originality/Value Studies of interpersonal affect regula-
tion often focus on people’s ability to successfully regulate
others’ emotions. In contrast, this is the first quantitative
study to explore factors that influence individual’s will-
ingness to persist in interpersonal affect regulation after
failure, and to investigate how individual differences
influence the personal outcomes associated with failed
attempts.
Keywords Interpersonal affect regulation  Humor 
Affect-related individual differences  Affective
perspective taking  Gender differences  Efficacy 
Motivation to persist  Narrative methodology
Introduction
Active efforts to regulate the feelings of others are a ubiq-
uitous part of social life. People deliberately try to influence
the emotions of others for a variety of purposes ranging from
self-interested material gain to altruistic social support. For
instance, subordinates may use humor to make their supe-
riors like them and feel happy (Cooper 2005), competitive
negotiators may try to induce guilt or empathic concern to
make their counterparts give up resources (Thompson 2011),
abusive leaders may induce fear to gain compliance from
subordinates (Harvey et al. 2007), and friends may reframe
painful events in ways that reduce stress and bring relief to
each other (Niven et al. 2009).
Despite the growing interest in the domain of interper-
sonal affect regulation (e.g., Niven et al. 2012b), the field
lacked a common framework until recently (see Niven et al.
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2009 for review). In order to build this framework, previous
research has focused on establishing that individuals can
successfully influence the emotions of others and on the
personal and interpersonal consequences of successfully
regulating others’ affect when required to do so (Niven et al.
2009; 2012a, b; Grandey et al. 2005). For example, on the
negative side mandated interpersonal affect regulation (i.e.,
emotional labor) can cause job strain and burnout (Grandey
et al. 2005). However, more naturally occurring interper-
sonal regulation of positive affect has been associated with
better client relationships and personal affective well-being
over time as well as trust and stronger relationships among
coworkers—outcomes that, in turn, may reduce conflict and
improve workgroup cohesion (Niven et al. 2012a, b). Despite
the scholarly and practical relevance of interpersonal affect
regulation, scholars have paid scant attention to the conse-
quences of failed interpersonal affect regulation (but see
Francis et al. 1999). Despite this lack of research attention,
interpersonal affect regulation is a skilled behavior and
nearly everyone experiences failed attempts at regulating
others’ feelings (Francis et al. 1999).
In this study, we inductively examine the experience of
failed interpersonal affect regulation through the lens of
humor. We use the lens of humor to develop theory about
how people experience and respond to failed interpersonal
affect regulation and what individual-level factors influence
their response. Whereas interpersonal affect regulation
refers to the process of consciously trying to change the
feelings of a target individual (Gross and Thompson 2007),
we define failed interpersonal affect regulation as the process
of consciously, but unsuccessfully trying to change the
feelings of a target individual such that the target’s emotional
expression either remains unchanged, changes less than
expected (e.g., humor that receives a chuckle versus a belly
laugh), or changes in a direction other than that intended
(e.g., trying to improve someone’s mood but receiving a
reaction that indicates anger or anxiety).
Scholars have argued that intentional humor involves all
of the core elements of interpersonal affect regulation
(Francis 1994; Francis et al. 1999; Niven et al. 2009). In turn,
we argue that humor provides a relevant and useful lens for
examining failed interpersonal affect regulation for four
reasons. First, humor is intended to influence positive affect.
Humor has been defined as remarks or non-verbal behaviors
that are intended to elicit the feeling of amusement and are
perceived by the targets as an intentional act (Robinson and
Smith-Lovin 2001; Cooper 2005).1 Further, humor regulates
affect through two well-established pathways. It redirects the
target’s attention toward a potentially amusing action or
communication and influences the target’s body including
the facial expressions, bodily postures, and motor move-
ments associated with joy (Koole 2009).
Second, humor does more than influence feelings by
creating amusement in the self and others. It also generates
‘‘positive emotions among members of an interacting
group by bonding them and/or reducing an external threat’’
(Francis et al. 1999, p. 171). For example, humor has been
shown to decrease the social distance between people
(Masten 1986; Sherman 1988) as well as increase bonding
and rapport (Romero and Cruthirds 2006). Thus, humor
plays an important role in the creation and maintenance of
interpersonal relationships.
Third, in contrast to other forms of interpersonal affect
regulation, which may or may not provide discernible
feedback, people receive immediate and undeniable feed-
back about the success or failure of their humor attempt—
i.e., targets either laugh or they do not. For example, one
medical provider stated, ‘‘I tried to make a joke to ease the
situation, and it just fell flat…[I] could tell from their body
language that they didn’t think it was funny’’ (Francis et al.
1999, p. 170).
Fourth, extant research provides evidence that humor
can act to regulate individual emotion (Mesmer-Magnus
et al. 2012). For example, individuals use humor to reduce
the impact of negative emotions (Samson and Gross 2012).
Moreover, humor can alleviate boredom and frustration
(Duncan 1982; Pryor et al. 2010) and be used as a coping
mechanism to attenuate the influence of stress encountered
in interpersonal situations (Martin et al. 2003).
In our view, the common dominator in all experiences of
failed interpersonal affect regulation is the negative affect
experienced by the agent. At the most basic level, failed
interpersonal affect regulation reflects goal interruption,
which generates negative affect (Mandler 1975). However,
such failed regulation, especially in the case of humor, can
also represent a threat to the agent’s social bonds with the
target (Francis et al. 1999; Romero and Cruthirds 2006).
Thus, in contrast to the goal of a humor attempt, which is
typically to increase the level of positive affect in an
interpersonal interaction, failed humor may lower positive
affect and generate negative affect in the agent.
Given the importance of positive affect for interpersonal
interactions such as helping and maintaining social bonds
(Fredrickson 2001; Niven et al. 2012a), for task-related
skills such as decision making and creativity (Estrada et al.
1997; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005; Isen 2008; Isen
et al. 1987), and for individual well-being (Niven et al.
2012b), we seek to better understand the effects of failed
interpersonal affect regulation by explicitly examining
people’s reactions to failed humor attempts.
1 Actions such as teasing or sarcasm are often intended to be
humorous to a target individual or to a target group observing a
dyadic interaction. However, teasing and sarcasm may be used for the
purposes other than humor such as criticism or aggression (Keltner
et al. 2001). Our study is restricted to the subset of such behaviors that
are intended to influence positive affect.
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Our paper is organized as follows. First, we describe
the focus of our inductive inquiry. Then, we present our
methods and analyses. We then adapt the results of the
analyses to inductively establish a general theoretical
model of factors influencing an agent’s response to failed
interpersonal affect regulation and conclude with a dis-
cussion of the theoretical and practical implications of
our model for interpersonal affect regulation in
organizations.
Focus of Inductive Inquiry
Our main goal was to examine how individual differences
may buffer agents from the negative experiences associated
with failed humor (e.g., increased negative emotion and
decreased self-efficacy) and bolster their self-reported
willingness to make new attempts at increasing the positive
affect of others. In order to do this, we first investigate
baseline information about failed humor. We uncover and
document, from the perspective of the agent, the range of
affective, cognitive, and behavioral indicators that are
associated with failed humor.
In particular, we focus on guilt, laughter, new humor
attempts, and humor self-efficacy. Whereas laughter is an
intended outcome of humor (Koole 2009), guilt is a likely
outcome of failed humor. Guilt may occur because failed
humor can offend targets (Francis et al. 1999), and guilt is
an emotion associated with the desire to redress wrongs
(Baumesiter et al. 1994; Bohns and Flynn 2012). More-
over, new humor attempts are important because they
maintain social interactions and allow for the possibility of
increased positive affect, which has benefits for individual
well-being, helping, and maintaining social bonds (Niven
et al. 2012a, b).
Finally, a great deal of evidence suggests that agent’s
confidence in their own ability (i.e., their humor self-effi-
cacy) may be impacted by the experience of failure
(Bandura 1997). Domain-specific forms of self-efficacy
have been shown to increase motivation toward goals
within a specific domain (Bandura 1997; Bandura and
Locke 2003), and thus, humor self-efficacy may influence
people’s willingness to persist in interpersonal affect reg-
ulation. Moreover, our focus on humor self-efficacy is
unique because the potential importance of efficacy in the
domain of interpersonal affect regulation has not received
research attention (Mayer et al. 2008).
Next, we looked for factors that buffer agents from the
negative effects of failed interpersonal affect regulation
and motivate them to continue in their effort to regulate the
affect of others. Specifically, we focused on guilt propen-
sity and perspective taking because both of these variables
are associated with relationship repair (Batson et al. 1995;
Baumeister et al. 1994; Bohns and Flynn 2012; Davis
1996) and responding to failed humor may require repair-
ing the interaction and/or relationship (Francis 1994;
Francis et al. 1999). For instance, affective perspective
taking, i.e., imagining other peoples’ feelings from their
point of view, is an empathy-related process (Davis 1996)
that may increase agents’ desire to help others feel better
(Batson et al. 1995) and thus may also increase their
willingness to persist in interpersonal affect regulation after
experiencing failure. Similarly, guilt, ‘‘an individual’s
unpleasant emotional state associated with possible objec-
tions to his or her actions, inaction, circumstances, or
intentions,’’ is associated with relationship repair behaviors
(Baumeister et al. 1994, p. 245; Bohns and Flynn 2012) and
thereby may increase the motivation to persist in inter-
personal affect regulation after experiencing failure.
Finally, we investigated gender as a substantive control
variable and possible individual difference factor for two
reasons. On the one hand, studies suggest that humor is
more important to men than it is to women (Bressler et al.
2006). On the other hand, women consistently outperform
men on experimental tasks related to interpersonal per-
ceptual accuracy (Hall and Schmid-Mast 2008) and are
also more accurate in judging the meaning of non-verbal
cues conveyed by others (Hall 1978; Hall and Schmid-Mast
2008; Hojat et al. 2002; Salovey and Mayer 1990; Woolley
et al. 2010). These findings provide evidence that gender
may influence the processes surrounding interpersonal
affect regulation, and specifically men’s and women’s
reactions to failed attempts.
In brief, our study was designed to use humor episodes
to inductively examine the psychological experience of
failed interpersonal affect regulation—the intrapersonal
affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of such
episodes. Given the difficulties of experimentally examin-
ing the psychological experience of failed humor (Francis
et al. 1999), the present study elicited autobiographical
narratives in which participants recounted interpersonal
encounters in which they had used humor and it had either
failed (failed humor condition) or succeeded (successful
humor condition). Autobiographical narratives have proven
useful in studying a range of phenomena that resist labo-
ratory simulation, such as romantic losses and rejections
(Baumesiter et al. 1993), hurt feelings (Leary et al. 1998),
and victim and perpetrator memories (Baumesiter et al.
1990; Stillwell and Baumeister 1997). Moreover, because
‘‘humor is a specific and easily recognizable form of
interaction,’’ it is particularly amenable to recall-based
methods such as autobiographical narratives (Francis et al.
1999, p. 156). Finally, the use of autobiographical narra-
tives allowed us to draw on a broad range of responses that
are likely to inform our understanding of failed interper-
sonal affect regulation.




One hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students
(74 % female) participated in the study. These participants
were recruited through the online subject pool at a large
northeastern research university. All participants took part
in exchange for $15.
Procedure
Participants completed questionnaires individually, in two
phases. The first phase asked all participants to complete
the same online questionnaire, which included individual
differences on measures of trait affectivity (including guilt
and affective perspective taking), humor self-efficacy, and
background demographic information. In the second phase,
which occurred 1 week after the first phase, participants
(both men and women) were randomly assigned to one of
the two conditions (i.e., failed humor narrative versus the
successful humor narrative condition). During the second
phase, participants wrote a randomly assigned narrative
and then responded to a second questionnaire that both
asked participants to recall their state affectivity and humor
self-efficacy following the attempt and asked detailed
questions about the events that were recounted.
Phase 1 Measures
In order to measure a range of responses to interpersonal
affect regulation in the form of successful and failed humor
attempts, a wide variety of measures were given. These
measures focused on the attitudes, cognitions, and behav-
iors of the participants. Initially, participants received an
online questionnaire regarding their humor self-efficacy,
trait affectivity [positive affect (PA), negative affect (NA),
trait guilt, and affective perspective taking], and demo-
graphic background. The 11-item Humor Production and
Social Uses of Humor subscale of the Self Sense of Humor
Scale was used to assess perceived humor self-efficacy.
The scale was deemed appropriate to measure humor self-
efficacy, or confidence in one’s ability to be humorous,
because it explicitly asks participants to rate their confi-
dence in their ability to use humor to accomplish a variety
of ends (e.g., amuse others, entertain friends, make others
laugh, ease a tense situation). Moreover, this measure has
been found to be positively associated with peers’ views of
humor ability in laboratory settings (Lefcourt and Martin
1986). Affective perspective taking, which focuses spe-
cifically on imagining how others are feeling from their
point of view (Davis 1996), was measured with Williams’
(2011) 3-item measure of affective perspective taking.
Participants were asked on a scale of 1 (Not characteristic
at all) to 5 (Very characteristic), the degree to which they
(1) try to understand others’ feelings, (2) think about how
they would feel if in the place of others, and (3) try to
imagine what emotions others are feeling. Trait affect was
measured using items from the 20-item positive and neg-
ative affect schedule (PANAS, Watson et al. 1988) and the
six-item guilt subscale of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark
1994). Participants were given a list of the affect-related
words and were instructed to ‘‘indicate the extent to which
you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on
average.’’ Finally, participants answered demographic
questions concerning their ethnicity and sex. Sex was
recorded with a categorical variable (1 = female,
0 = male). We used two categorical variables to capture
race/ethnicity. These variables reflected the two largest
ethnic groups in our sample: White (1 = Caucasian,
0 = all other) and Asian (1 = Asian, 0 = all other). The
baseline reference group included African-Americans and
Latinos.
Phase 2 Measures
One week after all participants completed the phase 1
questionnaire, they were randomly assigned to the failed or
successful humor condition and received the appropriate
questionnaire. Random assignment was used to address
sampling bias because subjects randomly chosen from a
given population have an equal chance of displaying any
given characteristic (Kirk 2012). It also avoided biases
associated with individuals whose characteristics may have
led them to select to write about failed versus successful
humor. For example, individuals with lower humor self-
efficacy may have chosen to write about a failed humor
event.2
In order to gather data on participants’ self-reported
thoughts and feelings related to humor attempts, partici-
pants were first asked to type an autobiographical narrative
about a humor attempt. In the successful humor condition,
they were asked to, ‘‘Please think of a story about a time in
the past 6 months when you tried to be humorous (i.e.,
make someone laugh), and you got the reaction you were
looking for,’’ whereas those in the failed humor condition
were asked to, ‘‘Please think of a story about a time in the
past 6 months when you tried to be humorous (i.e., make
someone laugh), and you did not get the reaction you were
looking for.’’ We included the phrase ‘‘to make someone
laugh’’ in our instructions for clarity and then coded nar-
rative responses for intentions to change the targets’ inner
2 Men and women were randomly assigned to the failed versus the
successful humor conditions (Nfailed was 74 % female and Nsuccess was
75 % female).
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feelings as well as change their outward emotional display.
Although recall biases can emerge when asking partici-
pants to remember an event from the past, these biases
usually occur when participants recall some information
related to a specific event, to the neglect of other applicable
information. Using a narrowing approach, asking partici-
pants to recall individual components of an overall event
has been found to attenuate these biases (Caruso et al.
2006). Therefore, to reduce instances of recall bias, we
structured the second survey by asking participants to sep-
arately address (a) what prompted the attempt, (b) how and
when they made the attempt, (c) what impact the attempt
had, and (d) how the agent reacted to the target’s response.
Additionally, to help ensure participants recalled an actual
event, we asked them to write the initials, age, gender, and
their relationship to the target of the humor attempt. How-
ever, because we understand that recall biases may still have
persisted, we explicitly test for them and further address the
implications of our findings in the discussion.
Participants were then asked whether they had a goal in
mind when making the attempt, what transpired following
the attempt, and why the attempt did, or did not, receive the
intended response. After typing their stories, participants
completed a detailed set of Likert scale rated survey items
about their autobiographical humor narratives. The items
were used to capture participants’ psychological experi-
ence of a failed/successful humor episode—their feelings,
cognitions, and behavioral responses.
Post-Narrative Measures: Feelings
Participants filled out questionnaires measuring their state
affect and self-esteem. In order to measure state affect, the
PANAS and PANAS-X were again utilized (Watson et al.
1988; Watson and Clark 1994). Specifically, this time,
participants were instructed to ‘‘please think back to your
feelings directly following the humor attempt, indicate the
extent to which you feel the following adjectives describe
your feelings of yourself after the humor attempt.’’ Addi-
tionally, we captured self-esteem by having participants
rate themselves on Leary et al.’s (1998) measure of six
positive and negative self-relevant items: stupid, undesir-
able, unlikeable, unattractive, intelligent, wise, likeable,
incompetent, attractive, competent, foolish, and desirable
(1 = Not at all; 5 = Extremely; see Leary et al. 1998).
Post-Narrative Measures: Cognitive Responses
Participants were explicitly asked about their humor self-
efficacy following the attempt using items from Lefcourt
and Martin (1986). Attributions were assessed using nar-
rative content analysis (see below).
Narrative Content Analysis: Cognitive and Behavioral
Reponses
Three undergraduate research assistants read the 127
narratives and classified each humor attempt based on
four dimensions. The research assistants, who were blind
to the purposes of the study at the time they coded the
narratives, were trained and then asked to assess (a) the
type of humor attempted, (b) the goal of the humor
attempt, (c) the behavior of the agent following the
attempt, (d) the reaction of the target following the
attempt, and (e) the attribution the agent made for the
success or failure of the attempt. These coding categories
were theoretically derived as manipulation checks (type
and goal of humor) or as foci of the study (behavior and
cognitive attributions).
However, some of the coding dimensions for each cat-
egory were developed inductively. The second author read
through all of the narratives to identify emergent coding
dimensions for each code category (Miles and Huberman
1994; Strauss and Corbin 1998). These emergent codes
were added to codes derived from the literature. The first
author then applied the coding scheme to a subset of nar-
ratives and together the authors revised the coding
dimensions before training the research assistants.
Although the literature on attribution theory identifies the
importance of internal versus external attributions, this
inductive process allowed us to uncover that participants
distinguished between two different types of external
attributions (those related to the target of the humor and
those related to the humor method).
The research assistants, who were blind to the purposes
of the study, coded all five categories for each story. First,
the research assistants were asked to assess the type of
humor attempted, i.e., whether the attempt made was
positive or negative. Negative humor was defined as situ-
ations in which the agent attempted to be funny by putting
down the targets, teasing them, or using sarcasm. For
example, one participant wrote that he or she, ‘‘mocked
(his or her friend), in a voice imitating her right after she
said something stupid (ID# 1384).’’ This was coded as
negative humor. Although these attempts were negative in
that they included some level of provocation or criticism,
they were intended to be humorous, to elicit positive affect,
i.e., ‘‘to make the target laugh.’’ Even acts such as teasing,
which can be used aggressively, also can be used to elicit
amusement (Keltner et al. 2001). For example, Keltner
et al. (2001, p. 234) note that when teasing contains
‘‘provocations accompanied by numerous off-record
markers’’ such as hints, questions, rhetorical questions, or
metaphors, it ‘‘will be perceived as playful.’’
We coded for the type of humor (positive or negative) to
see whether differences in the type of humor events
J Bus Psychol (2014) 29:651–668 655
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individuals were likely to recall in the successful versus
failed condition explained any of our findings about failed
humor. We surmised that because teasing and other nega-
tive humor strategies can be perceived as aggressive when
subtleties such as off-record markers are not used properly
(Keltner et al. 2001), individuals may be more likely to fail
when they use negative strategies than when they employ
more positive types of humor. In our sample, 42 partici-
pants reported a negative humor attempts and 85 reported a
non-negative humor attempts (n = 127).
Second, the research assistants were asked to judge the
goal of the humor attempt, i.e., whether the attempt
entailed trying to increase the target’s positive affective
bonds of friendship with the agent or trying to increase the
target’s general positive affect. For example, someone with
a goal of increasing positive affective bonds of friendship
wrote that he or she attempted to be funny because he or
she ‘‘wanted to maintain our friendship since we don’t get
to see each other that much (ID# 1220).’’ Participants who
tried to change the target’s positive affect made statements
such as they were ‘‘attempting to use humor to make him
feel better after a stressful day’’ (ID# 1227), ‘‘trying to put
him in a better mood’’ (#1337) or trying ‘‘…to make him
laugh and feel better (1220).’’ We coded for the goal of the
humor attempt to confirm our underlying assumption that
humor was being used to regulate the feelings of others. In
our sample, 99 participants had the goals of ‘‘increasing
positive affect,’’ 20 had the goal of ‘‘increasing affective
bonds’’ and eight were coded as other.
Third, all narratives were coded for the behavioral
response of the agent, i.e., whether, following the attempt,
the agent laughed, made a new and different attempt at
humor, repeated the same attempt, apologized for the
attempt or did nothing. For example, an agent making a
new different attempt stated that after the attempt they
‘‘followed up by making another joke to try to get [the
target] to laugh again (ID #1240).’’ Conversely, someone
who repeated the same attempt stated, ‘‘I continued telling
the same story, but tried to make it more ridiculous so she
would laugh (ID #1335).’’ One participant that was coded
as apologizing stated, ‘‘Two of the people at the table
chuckled but said that the joke was mean spirited. I apol-
ogized… (ID# 1307).’’ Finally, one participant who was
coded as doing nothing after the attempt stated that after
the attempt they ‘‘just didn’t make any more comments (ID
#1337).’’ We coded for the agent’s behavior following the
attempt to uncover patterns of behaviors associated with
failed humor.
Fourth, the research assistants coded each narrative for
the behavioral response of the target. Target’s behavioral
responses were initially coded into two categories:
responded as expected versus unexpected. These categories
were coded by all three research assistants. To gain addi-
tional insight into the type of expected and unexpected
responses that targets made, one research assistant and one
coauthor went back through the narratives. The three cat-
egories that emerged from the data included the target
laughed, the target was bothered by the attempt, and the
target continued the interaction. Specifically, targets were
only coded as laughing if this was explicitly mentioned in
the response. For example, one person recalled, ‘‘(the tar-
get) laughed and thanked me for listening (ID# 1236).’’
Next, humor attempts were coded as bothersome when the
target engaged in a specific negative behavior aimed at the
agent. For example, one person recalled that the target,
‘‘certainly did not smile. They didn’t really look at me
either. They just kept their eyes on the TV. Occasionally,
they might say something curt, but it wasn’t anything that
recognized my attempt to be fun and humorous (ID#
1211).’’ Finally, whether the target made an explicit
attempt to continue the interaction was cataloged. For
example, one person recalled that the target ‘‘smiled and
told me an anecdote as well (ID# 1303).’’
Finally, the research assistants coded participants’
cognitive attributions for the outcome of the humor
attempt, i.e., whether the outcome of the attempt was due
to themselves (an internal attribution), the target (an
external attribution), or the method of humor attempt (an
external attribution). Attributing the success or failure of
the attempt to the agent was characterized by participants
explicitly stating that something inherent in them had led
to the success or failure of the attempt. For example, one
participant said, ‘‘I was quite funny (ID# 1237),’’ whereas
another said a joke failed because, ‘‘I have a different
sense of humor from other people (ID# 1247).’’ Both of
these examples were coded as internal self-attributions.
Conversely, participants who attributed the success or
failure of an attempt to target(s) made comments such as,
‘‘It failed because people are too stressed (ID# 1209),’’
and ‘‘my friends are dumb (ID# 1249).’’ Finally, those
attributing failure to the attempt itself explicitly stated
that something inherent in the attempt, as opposed to
themselves, or the target, caused the outcome. For
example, one participant stated, ‘‘The joke was inappro-
priate (ID# 1212).’’ We coded for the agent’s attributions
following the attempt to uncover patterns of attributions
associated with failed humor. All disagreements in clas-
sification were resolved by discussion among the research
assistants. Finally, Shrout and Fleiss’ (1979) intraclass
correlations (2, 1) were calculated to assess interrater
reliability based on the premises that each judge rated
their own random sample of targets and the judge’s data
was combined for analysis. Interrater reliability exceeded
0.80 for all categories.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks
The descriptive statistics for all of our scales are presented
in Tables 1 and 2. The reliabilities of all scales were above
the 0.7 criteria established by Nunnally (1978).
Goals and Type of Failed Versus Successful Humor: Recall
Biases?
First, we investigated the goals and type of humor to
assess whether any recall bias appeared when individuals
recalled failed humor. To do this, we looked for sys-
tematic differences in the types and goals of humor
associated with recalling a successful versus a failed
humor attempt. We conducted a series of logistic
regressions to investigate whether humor type had a sig-
nificantly different role in influencing the type and goals
of failed versus successful humor attempts. We used the
Wald v2 statistic as an indication of the influence of
condition because it tests the unique contribution of an
independent variable to influence a focal binary outcome
variable. First, describing a successful or failed humor
attempt did not influence the rate at which participants
recalled an instance of negative humor, Wald v2 = 0.43,
p = 0.51. Specifically, about one-third of participants
describing both failed and successful humor attempts used
negative humor. Additionally, gender did not affect
humor type, Wald v2 = 2.66, p = 0.10. Similarly, the
goals of successful and failed humor did not differ as
indicated by our logistic regression analyses. In both
conditions, approximately 78 % of participants made a
humor attempt to raise the target’s general positive affect,
Wald v2 = 0.01, p = 0.97 and 16 % of participants made
their attempt to strengthen their positive affective bond to
the target, Wald v2 = 0.43, p = 0.51. Thus, because
people do not seem to recall different types of humor
episodes when asked to recount a failed versus a suc-
cessful humor attempt, we can be more confident that the
results reported below are related to the experience of
failed humor rather than to the experience of recalling a
particular type of humor (negative versus positive) or to a
particular humor goal that is associated with failed humor
(i.e., generating positive affect versus strengthening
positive affective bonds).
In addition, we have explicit evidence from coding of the
narratives that 94 % of the respondents intended to regulate
the internal feeling states of the targets as well as their out-
ward expression of laughter. Those individuals who did not
explicitly state a goal of regulating the internal feeling state
of the target tended to have the goal of regulating the target’s
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cannot determine conclusively whether or not they had the
goal of regulating the internal feeling state of the target.3
Manipulation Check: Documenting Responses to Failed
Versus Successful Humor
Next, we sought to uncover and document baseline infor-
mation about failed humor. We report affective responses
related to feelings and self-esteem followed by behavioral
responses and finally cognitive responses related to attri-
butions. We controlled for gender and ethnicity in all of our
analyses.
Responses to Failed Versus Successful Humor: Feelings,
Self-Esteem, and Humor Self-Efficacy
Whereas the type and goal of failed versus successful humor
did not differ, the outcomes of recalling a failed versus
successful attempt were markedly distinct. For these analy-
ses, the failed humor condition was coded as 1 and the suc-
cessful humor condition was coded as 0. First, linear
regression indicated that after recalling a failed attempt,
agents were more likely to report experiencing negative
affect, b = 0.39, t = 4.33, p \ 0.01, R2 = 0.22, and guilt,
b = 0.51, t = 6.26, p \ 0.01, R2 = 0.31, than those recall-
ing a successful attempt, and less likely to report positive
affect, b = -0.74, t = 11.39, p \ 0.01, R2 = 0.57. Addi-
tionally, participants who had recalled a failed attempt were
more likely to describe lower self-esteem, i.e., rating them-
selves as more stupid, undesirable, unlikeable, unattractive,
incompetent, and foolish, b = 0.60, t = 7.50, p \ 0.01,
R2 = 0.39, and were less likely to rate themselves highly on
the opposing, positive self-esteem items, i.e., intelligent,
likeable, wise, attractive, competent, desirable, than those
who had recalled a successful attempt, b = -0.60, t = 7.19,
p \ 0.01, R2 = 0.37.
Behavioral Responses to Failed Versus Successful Humor
Participants behavioral responses also differed based on
the outcome of their humor attempt. A series of logistic
regressions indicated that failed humor attempts were
more likely to result in apologies, Wald v2 = 4.01,
p = 0.04, changing the subject, Wald v2 = 4.50
p = 0.03, and doing nothing, Wald v2 = 7.16, p \ 0.01,
whereas they were less likely to result in the agent’s
laughter, Wald v2 = 16.84, p \ 0.01. Additionally, of
importance, there were no differences in the numbers of
new attempts made between conditions, Wald v2 = 0.01,
p = 0.94; however, humor success and humor self-effi-
cacy interacted to predict new humor attempts, Wald
v2 = 7.01, p \ 0.01. Specifically, those participants with
high humor self-efficacy were more likely to make a
subsequent attempt after failure, whereas no differences
arose in the success condition.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for the successful humor condition
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Time 1 1. Gender 0.74 0.44 –
2. Trait PA 3.51 0.73 -0.09 0.86
3. Trait NA 2.40 0.72 -0.06 0.03 0.90
4. Trait guilt 2.32 0.96 -0.10 -0.20 0.71** 0.79
5. Affective PT 3.62 0.83 -0.20 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.89
6. Humor ability 3.48 0.92 -0.05 0.35** 0.04 -0.06 -0.17 0.93
Time 2 7. State guilt 1.16 0.37 -0.03 -0.21 0.11 0.20 0.01 -0.14 0.86
8. New attempt 0.19 0.40 0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.14 -0.08 0.06 –
9. Laughed 0.51 0.50 0.04 -0.12 -0.23 -0.18 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.19 –
10. Changed subject 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 –
n = 66 11. Humor ability 3.16 0.89 -0.08 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.92
Men were coded as 0, women as 1
p [ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01
3 We did, however, investigate mean differences in responses to
humor incidents between individuals who did and did not explicitly
report this additional goal. There were no mean differences found
between the two groups in the successful humor condition. In the
failed humor condition, individuals with explicit goals of interper-
sonal affect regulation reported higher mean levels of positive affect
after failure and had higher means for describing new and repeated
humor attempts in their narratives. However, these mean differences
did not translate into a significant correlation between having explicit
affect regulation goals and any other variables including positive
affectivity and making new or repeated humor attempts after
reporting about failed humor.
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Cognitive Attributions for Failed Versus Successful Humor
We also used logistic regression to document whether self-
serving differences existed in people’s attributions for the
causes of failed versus successful humor attempts. Whereas
only 30 % of participants attributed failed humor to
themselves, 51 % personally took credit for a successful
attempt, Wald v2 = 5.08, p = 0.02. Conversely, a full
70 % of participants laid the blame for a failed attempt on
the target, whereas only 33 % of participants gave the
target credit for a successful attempt, Wald v2 = 14.60,
p \ 0.01. These patterns were consistent with a self-serv-
ing bias. There were no differences in attributions based on
the specific method used (e.g., physical prank, teasing).
The Effect of Failed Humor on the Target of the Humor
Attempt
In addition to coding the narratives for the behavior of the
agents, we also went through them to investigate the
recalled differences in the effects of failed versus suc-
cessful humor had on the target of the humor attempt. The
first, more obvious findings, indicated that failed humor
attempts were associated with less target laughter, Wald
v2 = 15.10 p \ 0.01, and perceptions of being more
bothersome, Wald v2 = 7.08 p \ 0.01. Additionally, the
failed humor condition was negatively associated with the
target’s likely of building on the interaction or responding
to the target at all, Wald v2 = 4.13, p = 0.04. This stresses
the importance of successful interpersonal affect regulation
in maintaining bonds with others.
Inductive Results for Failed Humor
Next, we conducted a series of analyses to explore the main
focus of our study: reactions to failed humor. We investi-
gated how individual differences in gender, affective per-
spective taking, and trait guilt were related to the
experience of failed humor and how these experiences
differed from those of successful humor. Explicitly, we
sought to understand how these individual differences
mitigated or exacerbated responses to failed humor and
how they were associated with (1) an agent’s willingness to
persist in attempts to regulate the positive affect of others
after failed humor, (2) an agent’s propensity to laugh fol-
lowing a humor attempt, (3) an agent’s feelings of state
guilt after a humor attempt, and (4) an agent’s humor self-
efficacy after a humor attempt. Again, we focused on an
agent’s own laughter as the expected outcome of humor,
guilt as a likely outcome offending a target during a failed
humor attempt, and humor self-efficacy as a type of
domain-specific confidence that is likely to decrease fol-
lowing a failed humor attempt. Participant’s willingness to
make new humor attempts was investigated because it
represents an explicit attempt to continue the interaction
with a target after a failure of interpersonal affect regula-
tion. To do this, we conducted regression analyses on the
full sample. We investigated the relationship between
individual differences measured during Phase 1 and psy-
chological experiences and behavioral responses reported
during Phase 2. Ethnicity and gender were included in all
analyses.
We then included an interaction term between the
individual difference variables/control variables and suc-
cessful versus failed humor condition to determine the
effect in the failed humor condition relative to the suc-
cessful humor condition. In our analyses, significance on
the interaction term reflects the difference in slope between
the two conditions, whereas the significance level of the
primary term reflects the effect of that primary term in the
condition coded as zero (Aiken et al. 1991). The results of
these analyses with humor condition coded, Success = 0,
Failure = 1, are shown are shown in 3, 4 and 5 so that the
significance of the coefficient on the primary term for each
individual difference will reflect the significance in the
successful condition (i.e., when success = 0) and the
interaction term will reflect the change in the slope of the
outcome regressed on the individual difference measure in
the failure condition (i.e., failure = 1). Although not in the
tables, we also reverse coded the humor condition coded,
Success = 1, Failure = 0. Below, we report the signifi-
cance of the primary term for each individual difference in
both the failed condition and the successful conditions.
Table 3 Association of participant’s state guilt with trait guilt,
affective perspective taking, and gender
Time 1 measures Time 2 State guilt
Affective perspective
taking
-0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.07
Trait guilt 0.31** 0.29** 0.31** 0.06
Gender (women = 1,
men = 0)




0.55** 0.90** 0.85** -0.01
Asian 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01
White 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.06
Success/
Fail 9 affective PT
-0.38




R2 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.46
Numbers for state guilt represent b values as these variables were
continuous. n = 127 for all full sample analyses
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01. n = 127
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State Guilt
First, there was a significant interaction of trait guilt and
humor condition on state guilt, bFailure 9 Trait = 0.63,
t = 3.33, p \ 0.01, such that slope of state guilt on trait
guilt was 0.63 greater in the failed condition. Trait guilt
was not significantly related to state guilt in the successful
condition as shown by the coefficient on the primary term
when (Success = 0), bTrait Guilt = 0.06, t = 0.62, n.s. (see
Table 3). We also reverse coded the Success/Fail variable
such that Failure = 0. We found that trait guilt was sig-
nificantly related to state guilt in the failed condition as
shown by the significant coefficient on the primary term
when Failure = 0, bTrait Guilt = 0.55, t = 7.15, p \ 0.01.
Additionally, there was a significant interaction effect of
gender and humor condition on state guilt, bFailure 9
Female = -0.39, t = 2.30, p = 0.02, such that the slope of
trait guilt on state guilt was 0.39 less for women in the
failed condition. Gender was not significantly related to
state guilt in the successful condition as shown by the
coefficient on the primary term when Success = 0,
bFemale = -0.01, t = -0.09, n.s. (see Table 3). In addi-
tion, we found that the intercept for being female was
significantly and negatively related to state guilt in the
failed condition as shown by the coefficient on the primary
term when (humor condition coded as failure = 0)
bfemale = -0.35, t = 3.42, p \ 0.01.
Humor Self-Efficacy at Time 2
Humor condition and affective perspective taking signifi-
cantly interacted to influence humor self-efficacy after
reporting the attempt, bFailed 9 Affective PT = 0.85,
t = 2.25, p = 0.03 such that affective perspective taking
was associated with humor efficacy in the failed, bAffec-
tive PT = 0.24, t = 2.01, p \ 0.05, but not in the success
condition, b = -0.16, t = 1.18, n.s. (Table 4). Trait guilt
did not interact with humor condition and was not related
to humor efficacy after controlling for the interaction
between humor condition and affective perspective taking.
Being female appeared to be negatively related to humor
efficacy across successful and failed conditions. However,
further analysis revealed that the relationship between
gender and humor efficacy was more complex.
To address this, we conducted a second set of regres-
sions that indicated that gender and affective perspective
taking interacted to influence humor efficacy, bwomen 9
Affective PT = 0.70, t = 3.05, p \ 0.01 (Figs. 1 and 2). The
interaction between humor condition and affective per-
spective taking remained marginally significant in these
analyses, but the interaction between gender and humor
condition was not significant nor was there a significant
3-way interaction among humor condition, gender, and
affective perspective taking.
Interestingly, affective perspective taking was only
significantly related to men’s humor efficacy in the failed
condition and women’s humor efficacy in the success
condition. For men, high-trait affective perspective taking
was associated with decreases in perceptions of their own
humor ability after failure relative to low-trait perspective
taking (Fig. 1). For women, high-trait affective perspective
taking was associated with increases in humor self-efficacy
Table 4 Association of participant’s humor efficacy with trait guilt,
affective perspective taking, and gender
Time 1 measures Time 2 humor efficacy
Affective perspective taking 0.07 -0.16 0.07 0.07
Trait guilt -0.18* -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
Gender (women = 1,
men = 0)
-0.22* -0.23** -0.14 -0.21
Success/Fail (Success = 0,
Fail = 1)
0.03 -0.78* 0.15 0.08
Asian -0.26* -0.23 -0.24 -0.24
White -0.22 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20
Success/Fail 9 affective PT 0.85*
Success/Fail 9 gender -0.17
Success/Fail 9 trait guilt -0.06
R2 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.13
Numbers for humor efficacy represent b values as these variables
were continuous. n = 127 for all full sample analyses
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01. n = 127
Table 5 Association of participant’s new attempts with state guilt,
humor efficacy, and gender
Time 1 measures Time 2 new attempts
Affective PT 3.92* 3.76* 1.99
Trait guilt 1.03 2.66 2.93?
Gender (women = 1, men = 0) 0.40 0.40 0.25
Success/Fail (Success = 0, Fail = 1) 0.01 2.28 6.45**
Asian 0.01 0.04 0.01
White 0.08 0.02 0.08
State guilt 2.16
Humor efficacy 1.08
Success/Fail 9 state guilt 3.51?
Success/Fail 9 humor efficacy 6.28**
R2 0.07 0.19 0.23
Numbers for new attempts represent Wald v2 values and these vari-
ables were binary. The R2 values for the binary variables are Nage-
lkerke R2
? p \ 0.10; * p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01. n = 127
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after success relative to low-trait perspective taking
(Fig. 2). Further, in both the failed and successful humor
conditions, high trait perspective taking brought men and
women’s perceptions of their humor ability into alignment,
suggesting the possibility that high perspective taking
allowed men to make more accurate downward adjust-
ments to their humor efficacy after failure, and women to
make more accurate upward adjustments to their humor
efficacy after success.
Agent’s Own Laughter
A similar analysis was conducted to test the influence of
trait guilt and affective perspective taking on agents’ ten-
dency to laugh in spite of a failed attempt. In this instance,
the analysis indicated that neither affective perspective
taking nor trait guilt were associated with laughter and
neither interacted with condition to influence an agent’s
own laughter, Wald v2 = 0.04, n.s. and Wald v2 = 2.29,
n.s., respectively.4
Willingness to Make a New Humor Attempt
In order to investigate the relative influence of trait guilt
and affective perspective taking on participant’s willing-
ness to make a new humor attempt, this willingness was
logistically regressed on both variables.
Results of the analysis indicated that affective perspec-
tive taking increased participant’s tendency to make a new
attempt after both success and failure, Wald v2 = 3.92,
p = 0.04 (see Table 5). The interaction between affective
perspective taking and success versus failure condition was
not significant Wald v2 = 0.04, n.s. nor was the interaction
between trait guilt and success versus failure condition
Wald v2 = 2.29, n.s.
However, the willingness to make new attempts was
related to two of the outcome variables in the failed con-
dition: humor efficacy at Time 2 and state guilt (Table 5).
There was a significant interaction between humor efficacy
at Time 2 and being in the success or failure condition
Wald v2 = 6.28, p = 0.01. Humor efficacy at Time 2 was
significantly related to new attempts in the failure condition
Wald v2 = 5.87, p = 0.02, but not in the success condition
Wald v2 = 1.08, n.s. There was also a marginally signifi-
cant negative interaction between state guilt at Time 2
(after experiencing the success or failure condition) and
being in the success or failure condition Wald v2 = 3.51,
p = 0.06.
Supplemental Analyses
SEM Analyses of Individual Differences After Failed
Humor
To further investigate the findings, we conducted a path
analysis on the variables above (i.e., a fully aggregated
structural equation model) using the data from the failed
humor condition (Fig. 3). SEM allowed us to examine
Fig. 1 The moderation of affective perspective taking on the
relationship between gender and humor self-efficacy following a
failed humor attempt
Fig. 2 The moderation of affective perspective taking on the
relationship between gender and humor self-efficacy following a
successful humor attempt
4 When we controlled for state guilt in our regresssion analyses, as
happened automatically in the SEM analyses in the following section,
affective perspective taking had a significant positive interaction with
condition such that it had stronger relationship to an actor’s own
laughter in the failed condition (Success/Fail 9 Affective PT, Wald
v2 = 3.60*, p \ 0.05).
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multiple dependent variables simultaneously and look for
mediation effects that were suggested by our previous
analyses (Kline 2005). Using Lisrel 8.8 software (Jo¨reskog
and Sorbom 1997), we found that the SEM model fit well
overall (v(28) = 32.80, p = 0.24, RMSEA = 0.05,
CFI = 0.95) and that the parameter estimates were con-
sistent with the regression results presented above. We
found that after controlling for trait positive affect (T1),
trait negative affect (T1), and the behavioral response of
changing the subject (i.e., no paths estimated), gender was
positively related to humor self-efficacy (c = 0.29,
p \ 0.05) and state guilt after failure (c = 0.28, p \ 0.05);
trait guilt (T1) was positively related to state guilt (T2)
(c = 0.50, p \ 0.01); state guilt (T2) was negatively and
directly associated with making a new attempt (c = -0.27,
p \ 0.05). Additionally, humor efficacy was positively and
directly related to making a new attempt (b = 0.36,
p \ 0.05), whereas the influence of affective perspective
taking on new attempts seemed to be indirect and mediated
by humor efficacy (i.e., a direct effect on humor efficacy,
c = 0.28, p \ 0.05), which in turn was related to new
attempts. Affective perspective taking was also positively
related to laughter after a failed attempt (c = 0.29,
p \ 0.05).
Because affective perspective taking (T1) was asso-
ciated with new attempts in our regression analyses, we
also tested a model freeing the path from affective per-
spective taking (T1) to new attempts (T2). A sequential
Chi square difference test indicated that the revised
model did not fit significantly better than our original
model (Dv(1) = 2.11, p = 0.15), so we retained the
more parsimonious model. Thus, although we cannot test
our model on the same data used to develop it, the
results presented here are suggestive of a more
comprehensive set of simultaneous relationships sum-
marized in Fig. 4.
It is important to note that our sample size was too small
to conduct a reliable robustness test using the full data set
and multiple group analyses. However, the suggestive
multiple group analyses that we conducted confirmed the
results presented here. The estimated paths in Fig. 3 were
significant in the failed condition and non-significant in the
success condition.
Discussion
In today’s society, telling a ‘‘bad joke,’’ that is, a joke that
is simplistic, silly, and likely to fail, has become humorous
in and of itself. Numerous websites advertise lists of ‘‘Bad
Jokes,’’ ‘‘Bad Jokes of the Day,’’ and ‘‘Really Bad Jokes’’
(https:/www.google.com, search term ‘‘bad jokes’’).5
However, our study suggests that failed humor is no
laughing matter. Failed humor, and more broadly the failed
interpersonal regulation of positive affect, may not only
lead to forgoing the potential benefits of positive affect
such as helpful, prosocial behavior, enhanced decision
making, and creativity (Fredrickson 2001; Isen 1987,
2008), but also may result in negative affect, decreased
self-esteem, and the unwillingness to persist in affect reg-
ulation efforts. In other words, our results suggest the
viewing affect regulation as a communicative process (that
Fig. 3 SEM analysis of failed
humor (*Model controls for trait
positive affect, trait negative
affect, and behavioral response
of ‘‘changing the subject’’)
5 A sample ‘‘bad joke’’ follows (http://www.rinkworks.com/jokes/,
joke #882):
Actor: ‘‘What did the fisherman say to the card magician?
Target: ‘‘What?’’
Actor: ‘‘Pick a cod, any cod!’’
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can either succeed or fail) has important implications for
the study of humor in organizations.
Despite the commonality and importance of failed
efforts at interpersonal affect regulation, inadequate
research attention has been paid to this phenomenon. To
address this oversight, we conducted an inductive study
using humor as a lens to investigate how making failed
versus successful attempts at interpersonal affect regulation
was associated not only with agents’ feelings, cognitions,
and behaviors, but also with how individual differences
mitigated or conversely, exacerbated reactions to failed
humor attempts.
Specifically, with our descriptive statistics and manip-
ulation check, we both documented individuals’ responses
to recalling failed humor and uncovered a noteworthy
pattern of results. First, we investigated and documented
whether recalling a failed humor attempt was a negative
experience for the agent or whether humor was experi-
enced as a ‘‘frivolous’’ method of interpersonal affect
regulation such that individuals would take success or
failure in stride. We found that recalling a failed humor
attempt indeed was associated with decreased positive
affect and self-esteem and increased guilt. Although we
cannot disentangle affective responses to recalling failed
humor from the general recall of failure, respondents’
reported behaviors at the time of the humor event that
provide corroborating evidence of negative affective
reactions. Agent’s reported a tendency toward avoidance
behaviors associated with negative affect (e.g., doing
nothing or changing the subject), which suggests it is likely
that individuals experienced negative affect at the time of
their failed interpersonal affect regulation (Chen and Bargh
1999; Markman and Brendl 2005).
Our findings suggest that making humor attempts can
increase the positive affect in a relational interaction but
can also risk reducing it. When interpersonal affect reg-
ulation is successful, our data suggest that the agent as
well as the target, who typically laughed and was more
willing to build on the interaction, experienced increased
positive affect. Although beyond the scope of our study,
this increase in positive affect may have important
implications for agents. Research on positive affect con-
sistently finds that positive affect can increase helpful,
prosocial behavior, enhance decision making, and boost
creativity (Isen 1987, 2008). Similarly, research on the
successful regulation of positive affect suggests that
agents can experience improved well-being and stronger
relationships (Niven et al. 2012a, b). For these reasons,
viewing interpersonal affect regulation as a process that
can succeed or fail in increasing positive affect has
implications for a variety of personal, interpersonal, and
work-related outcomes.
Fig. 4 Inductive model of failed interpersonal affect regulation (*Model assumes controls for trait positive affect and trait negative affect)
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Implications of Our Inductively Derived Model
First, our inductively derived model suggests that affective
perspective taking, trait guilt, interpersonal affect regula-
tion self-efficacy, and gender, each play an important role
in individuals’ experience of failed interpersonal affect
regulation. In the specific case of humor, affective per-
spective taking and humor self-efficacy were associated
with a higher likelihood of making a new humor attempt,
whereas state guilt after failure was associated with a lower
likelihood.
Future research could extend this work by investigating
the mechanisms associated with each individual difference.
For instance, because affective perspective taking is related
to greater valuing of the well-being of others (Batson et al.
1995), it may be that individuals high in affective per-
spective taking were better able to remain focused on the
target’s need for positive affect and their initial desire to
help the target. In fact, in our sample, the correlation
between affective perspective taking and new attempts was
stronger for individuals with the goal of increasing the
target’s general positive affect. Moreover, affective per-
spective taking was associated with a higher likelihood of
making a new humor attempt after a successful as well as a
failed humor attempt, suggesting that the benefits of
affective perspective taking may extend to a wide variety
of situations involving interpersonal affect regulation.
We also uncovered an efficacy-based process related to
interpersonal affect regulation. Humor self-efficacy had a
positive relationship to new humor attempts, but only after
failure, suggesting that people’s self-efficacy related to
humor and other specific domains of interpersonal affect
regulation may be a critical aspect of their experiences of
failed interpersonal affect regulation and their willingness
to persist. This finding corroborates past research sug-
gesting that domain-specific efficacy increases people’s
tendency to persist in the face of failure (Bandura 1997).
Importantly, the fact that humor self-efficacy may mediate
the impact of affective perspective taking on new attempts
after failure suggests that it is not only emotional intelli-
gence (i.e., the emotion management dimension, Salovey
and Mayer 1990), but also efficacy with respect to one’s
emotional intelligence that may be critical for how people
experience successful versus failed affect regulation
attempts and how these processes unfold over time.
Our findings with respect to guilt were counterintuitive.
Although guilt often prompts relationship repair (Baumei-
ster et al. 1994), we found that people who felt guilty after
failure (i.e., were high on state guilt) were slightly less
likely to try a new attempt. This finding suggests that future
research needs to examine how ignoring a faux pas might
be a strategy for relationship repair that is as important to
understand as the use of apologies and accounts. Perhaps
such behavior allows the incident to ‘‘blow over’’ such that
both the target and the agent can save face. The agent does
not dwell on having made a failed attempt, and the target is
allowed to avoid feeling inadequate for not understanding
or responding as expected to the interpersonal affect reg-
ulation attempt.
Finally, we did find direct effects of gender on humor self-
efficacy and state guilt. In terms of guilt, we believe that
gender is likely to have an important role in interpersonal
affect regulation more broadly but that the specific effects of
gender may differ across different types of regulation. For
instance, it is unclear whether men will always feel more guilt
than women after failed interpersonal affect regulation
attempts because relative to women, men are likely to rate as
important both their own humor ability and other’s recep-
tivity to their humor (Bressler et al. 2006). Thus, because
humor is likely to be more central to the identity of men than
women (Bressler et al. 2006), failing at humor may be
associated with more guilt in men than women. However,
affect regulation processes that are more central to the
identity of women may have the inverse effect and, for
example, be associated with greater guilt in women than men.
Future research could examine whether failing at inter-
personal affect regulation strategies linked to empathy, for
example, has a more negative effect on women’s emotional
responses and a less negative effect on their affect regu-
lation efficacy than it does on men’s. Empathy-related
skills such as listening to another’s problems may be more
important to women because empathic concern is associ-
ated with the stereotype of women and also socialized in
young girls (Cross and Madson 1997; Eagly and Wood
1999). Moreover, if the impact of sex differences on the
experience of failed interpersonal affect regulation is in
fact moderated by the importance of the particular domain
of affect regulation, our finding could open up a broader
investigation of identity concerns within the context of
interpersonal affect regulation.
Moderation: Affective Perspective Taking, Gender,
and Humor Efficacy
Because of the benefits of maintaining positive affect, we
were also interested in factors that might buffer individuals
against the negative effect of failed interpersonal affect
regulation. Our humor findings suggest that affective per-
spective taking may operate in this way. Moreover, the
interaction between gender and affective perspective taking
provides nuance to our general finding that women seem to
show significantly less humor efficacy after both failed and
successful humor attempts.
In the case of failed humor, perspective taking did not
influence women’s humor self-efficacy after a failed attempt.
However, low perspective taking buffered men from the
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decreased humor self-efficacy associated with their failed
attempts, whereas high perspective taking exacerbated the
negative impact associated such failure (Fig. 1). For high
perspective takers, both men and women reported similar
levels of humor efficacy associated with a failed attempt. Our
findings suggest that when perspective taking is low, over-
confidence may buffer men from the influence of failed
humor on their beliefs in their humor self-efficacy. However,
when perspective taking is high, both men and women per-
ceive their humor self-efficacy similarly after failure.
Under the condition of humor success, we found gender
effects for women but not men. Affective perspective
taking did not influence men’s humor efficacy after suc-
cess. However, for women, high perspective taking was
related to significantly greater humor efficacy after success.
In the successful humor condition, high perspective taking
women reported similar levels of humor efficacy to men.
In other words, perspective taking seems to allow men
and women to more appropriately adjust their efficacy
beliefs. Appropriate adjustments upward should increase
individuals’ willingness to persist in interpersonal affect
regulation efforts, whereas appropriate adjustments down-
ward may provide a better chance to succeed in future
interactions, instead of making similar errors or miscalcu-
lations. Moreover, this finding allows for the possibility
that the opposite pattern of results could be found for other
methods of interpersonal affect regulation that may be
more important to the identity of women and for which
women are more confident than men.
Implications for Practice
Humor is a ubiquitous and potentially beneficial part of
organizational life. Katherine Hudson, former CEO of the
Brady Corporation, contends that humor can ‘‘foster esprit
de corps…spark innovation…increase the likelihood that
unpleasant tasks will be accomplished… [and] relieve
stress’’ (Hudson 2001 cited in Romero and Cruthirds 2006).
Her comments are consistent with the well-researched
benefits of humor and of positive affect, more generally,
for decision making, creativity, and prosocial behavior
(Fredrickson 2001; Isen 1987, 2008).
However, when managers tout the benefits of humor,
they rarely consider the personal and interpersonal costs of
failed humor attempts. Our study suggests that failed
humor and the importance of employees’ willingness to
persist and try again should be placed on the managerial
radar. Specifically, because the successful interpersonal
regulation of positive affect even after a failed attempt
increases positive affect, persistence in such regulation
attempts has implications for helping behavior, decision
making and creativity in interdependent work relationships,
project teams, and organizations as a whole.
Research on relationship-specific measures of perspec-
tive taking has further implications for organizations. This
research suggests that relationship-specific and context-
specific measures of perspective taking have a consistent
but stronger effect on outcomes than do measures of dis-
positional measures of perspective taking (Davis 1996;
Galinsky et al. 2008). Based on this research, we believe
that it is not only people’s trait guilt and perspective taking
that are likely to matter but also their relationship-specific
and context-specific propensity to feel guilt and engage in
perspective taking in their work versus home environments
or with team members versus managers, for example. If, as
we believe, context is important and context-specific
measures of guilt and perspective taking will have similar
effects to those we have shown here, then our findings
suggest that managers can take either a group-level or an
individual-level approach to facilitating the successful use
of positive humor and interpersonal regulation of positive
affect in the workplace.
At the group level, norms that decrease feeling of guilt
over failure and increase compassion may increase indi-
viduals’ willingness to persist after a failed attempt at
interpersonal affect regulation by influencing guilt and
affective perspective taking, respectively. For example,
team cultures that emphasize psychological safety (Ed-
mondson 1999) and organizational cultures that foster love
(Barsade and O’Neill 2014), forgiveness (Fehr and Gelfand
2012), and compassion (Lilius et al. 2011) may increase the
degree to which individuals engage in context-specific and
relationship-specific affective perspective taking, while at
the same time reducing individuals’ tendency to associate
guilt and blame with failure in the organizational context.
At the individual level, our model suggests that self-
efficacy as it pertains to interpersonal affect regulation
strategies may be of critical importance. In organizations,
managers may use skill-based training to increase the
degree to which individuals gain self-efficacy with respect
to their use of a variety of effective strategies for managing
their emotions and those of others (e.g., affective per-
spective taking, Williams 2011; reappraisal influence,
Little et al. 2013; and humor, Niven et al. 2011). This may
not only increase individuals’ willingness to persist in the
regulation of other people’s positive affect, but also the
ability to move seamlessly among different strategies
rather than resorting to ‘‘doing nothing’’ as did many of our
respondents.
Limitations
Despite its inherent strengths, this study has several limi-
tations. Autobiographical narratives are a useful tool for
studying interpersonal phenomena such as failed humor
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that are difficult to recreate within the laboratory (Francis
et al. 1999; Leary et al. 1998). Indeed, because ‘‘humor is a
specific and easily recognizable form of interaction,’’ it is
particularly amenable to recall-based methods such as
autobiographical narratives (Francis et al. 1999, p. 156).
Although the method we used in this research was appro-
priate for investigating how individual differences influ-
ence people’s subjective experience and behavioral
responses to successful and failed interpersonal affect
regulation, the inherent limitations of autobiographical
narratives must be considered.
First, it is not possible to know the heuristics people
used to recall humor episodes and whether these heuristics
differed for successful and failed humor episodes.
Although using autobiographical narratives has strengths,
one drawback is that this methodology leaves open the
possibility of recall biases. Although most respondents
described events occurred in the past week, we gave them a
window of up to 6 months to choose an event. Memories of
the event may have changed over this time period. Despite
this limitation, several steps were taken to investigate
potential sources of bias in our study. First, the study was
conducted in two phases to minimize the influence of Time
1 answers on the Time 2-dependent measures. Addition-
ally, the type of humor used and the motivations for using
humor were coded by independent coders blind to the
purpose of the study and then compared across the failed
and successful humor conditions to look for possible recall
biases. As stated, no differences were found between these
variables in our two conditions, supporting the premise that
the participants’ ratings on the survey scales were likely
related to recalling failed versus successful humor rather
than biased recall of a particular a type of humor event
(positive versus negative) or a particular motive associated
with engaging in the humor attempt.
Second, self-serving biases are always present to some
degree in autobiographical narratives. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the general pattern of results does
not apply (Leary et al. 1998). The fact that the narratives
were related in a systematic way to individual differences
measured a week before the narratives were written and to
content analysis of the narratives by independent coders
blind to the purpose of the study provides converging
evidence and promotes confidence in the reliability of our
participants’ self-reports. Thus, despite the limitations of
the use of narratives, we believe that this study offers an
important step toward understanding failed interpersonal
affect regulation.
The fact that humor can be used to regulate affect in two
different ways is both strength and a limitation of this
study. Humor may be used in a response focused manner to
change target’s outward emotional expression, i.e., ‘‘to get
people to laugh’’ or to try to change target’s inner feeling
state, i.e., to make them feel better. In a study of humor,
these goals are intertwined. Agents who want to change
targets’ internal states also want them to show a visible
sign of feeling better, i.e., to laugh and smile. Conversely,
agent’s who only want targets to laugh are also likely to
change the internal state of those targets because the
muscle movement associated with laughter and genuine
smiling improve affect (Buck 1980). Although most of our
respondents (94 percent) explicitly reported the goal of
trying to change the target’s inner feeling state, for the
other respondents, it is unclear whether they were operating
with this goal in mind. It is possible that they used humor
solely to ‘‘make people laugh.’’ This would regulate affect
but also might generate more self-relevance for the agent
with respect to success or failure. However, we found no
empirical evidence that having the explicit goal of chang-
ing the target’s affect versus not explicitly having this goal
was significantly correlated with agents’ attributions,
feelings, self-esteem, or behavior after recalling the inci-
dent. Further, the failure condition did not seem to make
respondents less likely to recall and report the other-ori-
ented goal of changing the target’s positive affect. We
would expect this difference in goals if the failure condi-
tion narrowed respondents’ focus to their own humor
ability, appearing funny and ‘‘getting a laugh.’’ However,
respondents in the failed humor condition were no less
likely to explicitly report the goal of changing the target’s
affect than respondents in the successful humor condition.
Finally, our study is limited to examining one type of
interpersonal affect regulation, humor. Although humor is
ideal for the study of failed interpersonal affect regulation
because agents receive immediate and clear feedback
about the success or failure of their attempt, it also may
limit the generalizability of the study to other methods of
interpersonal affect regulation. Of particular concern are
methods of interpersonal affect regulation that are not
likely to be as central to an agent’s self-concept as humor
is likely to be. For example, reappraisal is a strategy that
can be used to improve or worsen affect and may not be
highly self-relevant. However, a range of affect-improv-
ing strategies such as complimenting and listening (Niven
et al. 2009) are likely to tap into characteristics such as
niceness, helpfulness, and empathy that are often central
to individuals’ identities, especially individuals with
relational self-concepts (Cross et al. 2000; Cross and
Madson 1997). Thus, our findings may be most applicable
to affect-improving strategies that are self-relevant. Future
research should investigate failing at affect-worsening
strategies such as aggression that are likely to be anti-
thetical to maintaining a relational self-concept but con-
sistent with other positive self-representations (e.g.,
gender stereotypes for men, especially those working in
male-dominated industries).
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Conclusion
Despite emotions being a ubiquitous part of social life,
until recently, the study of interpersonal affect regulation
has lacked a common framework (Niven et al. 2009). One
consequence of this disparity has been that failed inter-
personal affect regulation and its cognitive, affective, and
behavioral consequences has been largely ignored. How-
ever, our work shows that the investigation of interpersonal
affect regulation as a process that can succeed or fail is
vital to understanding how it affects people in social
environments. Failure to regulate another person’s positive
affect has negative consequences for the agent and poten-
tially for his or her relationship with the target, while
successful attempts not only have positive consequences
for the agent but are likely to generate additional benefits
associated with increased positive affect such as improved
decision making. Because of this, it is hoped that the cur-
rent study is viewed as a first step in promoting a new
perspective on interpersonal affect regulation—one that
allows for the possibility of failure. Bringing the possibility
of failure to center stage allows researchers to investigate
and managers to address the psychological processes that
mitigate and, conversely, exacerbate the negative impact of
these failures as well as factors that motivate persistence in
the regulation of interpersonal positive affect and processes
that enhance the effectiveness of interpersonal affect
regulation.
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